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The ANC and INC in Comparative Perspective 
 
CLEMENS SPIEß 
 
University of Heidelberg, Germany1 
 
 
As the Congress represented every section of Indian 
society, it was the natural party of governance. Only the 
Congress could provide stable and effective government. 2 
 
This recent statement by Sadiq Ali, the former general secretary (1958-62, 66-67, 
68) of the (undivided) Indian National Congress (INC), indicates the political 
actor’s perception of a legitimate claim of the INC to the commanding heights of 
India’s polity, a claim that was based on a (perceived) national consensus on the 
benefits of one-party-dominance (OPD) which at that time also matched public and 
academic discourse on party systems in the developing world (for example 
Huntington 1968: 146-147). 
Now that “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1992) has become such a popular 
proclamation, and everybody – in the name of ‘good governance’ – is talking about 
multi-party democracy as a remedy for nascent democracies in developing 
countries, nobody seems to remind the disastrous results that multi-party 
democracy has brought about in most of these countries immediately after 
independence or transition to democracy. OPD has almost become a four-letter 
word bearing the connotations of creeping authoritarianism and the mental legacies 
of so many single-party states. But India – despite decades wherein the country was 
able to combine OPD with almost all features of a liberal democracy - is still a 
                                                 
1 Clemens Spieß is Lecturer, Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute, 
University of Heidelberg (e-mail: sclemens@sai.uni-heidelberg.de). An earlier version of 
this paper was presented at the Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Edinburgh, 
May 2002. 
2 Personal Communication; interview conducted at Gandhi Memorial, New Delhi, on 
December 18, 2000. 
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vibrant democracy, a record that puts her apart from most of the post-colonial 
states’ world3. 
Just across the Indian ocean - seven years after the end of apartheid was 
officially launched4 and two days before South Africa’s second democratic general 
election took place- Firoz Cachalia, the then African National Congress’ (ANC) 
leader of the house in the Gauteng5 legislature, authored an article in one of the 
country’s leading newspapers stating that 
 
Some academics and opposition politicians have, for a long time now, 
been making the argument that SA (South Africa, C. S.) is developing 
a system of one-party dominance that is dangerous for democracy and 
that consequently SA needs an effective opposition to protect 
democracy. (…) I will (…) argue that the ANC's dominance 
strengthens the prospects of democratic consolidation and is good for 
both economic growth and in the long term for greater social equality. 
(…) for most of its history, the ANC has been committed to an 
inclusive nationalism and its values have been strongly shaped by the 
enlightenment's universalism. It achieved its position of dominance in 
liberation politics and in post-apartheid SA through the methods of 
secular politics. Its dominance is thus the result of successful 
contestation, not the absence of it.6 
 
Cachalia, like Ali, refers to the all-inclusive nature of the ANC in a bid to 
legitimise a distinct configuration of a party system which is still not entirely 
conceived of as satisfactorily fulfilling the criteria set forth by the normative ideal 
of a liberal democracy. Consequently, he hastens to add the competitive nature of 
the ANC’s dominance which is seen by him as a sine qua non for successful 
democratisation. 
                                                 
3 Although India’s status as a full-fledged democracy is questioned by some scholars, this 
study is in accord with most of the scholarly literature as regards India’s classification as a 
democracy. For a critical assessment of India’s democratic credibility which hinges exactly 
on the (concentrated) state of the country’s party system see Vanhanen (1997). 
4 The watershed speech by former President F. W. de Klerk on 2 February 1990, wherein he 
announced the unbanning of the liberation movements, their leaders’ release from prison 
viz. their opportunity to return from exile, and, the lifting of restrictions on the media and 
other domestic organisations, is taken here as the starting point of the negotiations that led 
to the first general democratic elections of 1994, and, finally, to the end of apartheid. As 
Mattes puts it: “To understand South Africa’s first universal franchise election and its 
preceding campaign, we must begin not in 1994 or even 1993, but in February 1990 (…) 
we need to begin in 1990 because how South Africa got to ‘here’ from ‘there’ has deeply 
affected what the campaign and elections of 1994 looked like. In other words, how the 
elections were conducted and contested cannot be understood without reference to the 
negotiations that led to those elections.” (1994: 1) 
5 Gauteng is one of the nine provinces of contemporary South Africa. 
6 ‘ANC Dominance Strengthens SA’, Business Day (Johannesburg), May 31, 1999. The 
article has been included to the article section of the ANC’s official homepage 
(http://www.anc.org.za/election/articles/dominance.html). 
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Scholarly concern about South Africa’s political development has increased 
tremendously in the last decade due to its singularity as the world’s only post-
apartheid society and as the last remaining ‘powerhouse’ on an otherwise “hopeless 
continent”.7 But whether South Africa will follow the path of political decay like so 
many of its sub-Saharan democratising predecessors, or, whether it will take the 
lead in what has been called a continent on the brink of an “elusive dawn”8 is at the 
heart of a heated debate in the academic world with the nature of the country’s 
party system becoming more and more of a ‘bone of contention’. 
Both countries share a similar historical outcome as concerns their party 
systems albeit within very different temporal and spatial contexts. India’s system of 
OPD was electorally terminated in 1977 when for the first time in the country’s 
history the INC 9 was ousted from office and power by the Janata Party, a multi-
party electoral platform comprising four major opposition parties.10 South Africa so 
far had only two general (democratic) elections (1994 and 1999) wherein the ANC 
won an overwhelming share of the popular vote (62,65% and 66,35% respectively), 
but which do not allow to make an assessment of the country’s party system 
without some qualifications regarding the dynamic nature of a pattern of party 
competition still in the making. What are the causal factors that made the 
emergence of a system of OPD in India after independence possible and make it 
likely in the South Africa of today? Why was it that a single party in a competitive 
democratic environment succeeded in winning one election after another amidst 
processes of massive social change, and, why is it that a single party is still able to 
do so at the end of the 20th century? What did OPD do to the political and socio-
economic development in the world’s largest democracy, and, what will be the 
effects of its working in the world’s most amazing democracy? How do the 
political actors’ perception mentioned above match with the academic wisdom of 
our times? 
Taking India as the locus classicus of OPD in changing societies11, the 
following is an attempt to draw advantage from a diachronic comparison between 
                                                 
7 Cover of the Economist, 13 May, 2000. 
8 Cover of the Economist, 24 February, 2001. 
9 After the split of the INC in 1969, the two factions contested elections as separate parties 
named INC and INC (O) – ‘O’ for ‘Organisation’ – with the INC headed by Indira Gandhi 
as the successful ‘heir’ of the undivided INC’s dominant position. Another split of the INC 
in 1977 led to the emergence of the INC (I) – ‘I’ for ‘Indira’ - , the party led by Indira 
Gandhi, and the INC (as formally recognised by the Election Commission), which was 
successively renamed as INC (U) and Indian Congress (Socialist) (ICS). In 1981 he INC (I) 
was formally relabelled as INC. If not indicated otherwise, INC is used in the following as 
a common denominator for the undivided party up to 1969, the Indira-led INC up to 1977, 
the INC (I) and the INC after 1981. 
10 The ‘real’ end of OPD in India is a highly debated issue in the scholarly discourse on the 
Indian party system with the years of 1967, 1969, 1975, 1977, 1991 and 1996 all figuring as 
respective dates of termination in the scholarly literature. 
11 ‘Changing societies’ is used here as a generic term comprising those countries wherein 
democratic transition or consolidation still takes place and social change in terms of 
political and economic development as well as modernisation is the single most important 
determinant of societal interests as in most of the world’s post-colonial states or developing 
countries. 
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the Indian party system after independence and the emerging one in South Africa 
in order to free the political phenomenon of ‘OPD’ from some of the theoretical 
and conceptual flaws surrounding it, to examine common thinking about a party 
systems’ emergence and working on the basis of two regional realities, and, finally, 
to enrich the current scholarly hypothesising about the correlation between the 
nature of the party system and processes of democratic consolidation and socio-
economic development with some empirical backing. 
 
OPD AS A PENDING PHENOMENON OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
Despite its ostensibly continued existence and reference in scholarly minds and 
works, OPD has kept its character as a pending phenomenon of political science. A 
few attempts to grasp its logic and to fit it into common knowledge of democratic 
and party theory have been done leaving behind as many assessments of OPD as a 
(democratic) matter of course as postulates of it as a democratic anomaly, as many 
delineations of a model of democratic stability as classifications of a transitional 
phenomenon, as many blessings of its contribution to democratic consolidation and 
socio-economic development as condemnations of its perversion of democratic 
practices. Since democratic practice in one-party-dominant systems is still a 
controversial matter of academic debate manifest in catchy book titles that hint at 
their scholarly subject as ‘Uncommon Democracies’ (Pempel 1990) or an 
‘Awkward Embrace’ (of democracy) (Giliomee and Simkins 1999) – to name the 
only two volumes to date solely devoted to the subject -, an examination of the 
specific configuration of a party system displayed by OPD could therefore enrich 
research on democratisation and how democracies function. 
But apart from any normative account of OPD’s putative weaknesses or 
strengths, political science has first to tackle its conceptual and analytical 
clarification. In terms of electoral dominance the definition we get from Pempel 
(1990: 3-4) is still very useful. According to him there are four crucial dimensions 
when dealing with party dominance in a competitive environment: To be 
considered as dominant a party must be (1) dominant in number; but this criterion 
does count only if the party is (2) electorally dominant for an uninterrupted and 
prolonged period; it must enjoy (3) a dominant bargaining position always setting 
the tone when it comes to government formation, and, (4) it must be dominant 
governmentally determining the public policy agenda. 
Additionally, from the angle of electoral dominance, given the point of view 
taken here that one-party-dominant systems are essentially democracies12, OPD is 
                                                 
12 The clear dissociation from non-democratic regimes is necessary since (democratic) one-
party-dominant systems form a distinct analytical category. OPD would not be a puzzling 
phenomenon of political science if repression or fraud were to be involved in the up-
holding of a party’s dominance. In that case, it would even be difficult to speak of a 
‘system’ since the dominant party would not be dependent on any kind of interaction with 
other political forces for it could rely on repression to push through its interests. Scholarly 
contributions that lump together democratic and non-democratic OPD are to be found in 
abundant profusion and do not contribute to any further understanding of the few ‘true’ 
(democratic) types of OPD. Clearly, the notion of democratic competition in India as well 
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to some extent a ‘fluid’ category. Sooner or later (depending on the participation 
process or on elite behaviour) it gives way to two- or multi-party competition or an 
authoritarian one-party state. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult to decide 
after how many consecutive majorities a party system could be labelled as one-
party-dominant.13 But OPD – as already outlined in Pempel’s definition - 
comprises more than just the continued dominance of the electoral process.14 
Duverger’s (1959: 308) by now famous formulation that a dominant party is a 
party that is “identified with an epoch” clearly points in the direction of a necessary 
incorporation of qualitative aspects regarding the assessment of a party’s 
dominance. However, given that insight, the problem remains that any further 
judgement of a party’s dominance in terms of its qualitative features has to be 
operationalised and abstracted in such a way that it makes comparisons and 
generalisations possible. This becomes even more challenging when one is dealing 
with the level of party system. Apart from the numerical domination of the 
electoral process and the preponderance over a certain Zeitgeist, the interactive 
aspects of systemic relations have to be taken care of. Conceptual boundaries have 
to be drawn around the dominant party’s relationship to other parties, societal 
interests, the electorate, state apparatus and changing socio-political conditions. 
For this purpose we have to look firstly at the more prominent lacunae in 
common party system theory, especially when dealing with party systems in 
changing societies, for they give us a first hint at what may be missing factors for 
the explanation of OPD in changing societies, and then we have to relate them to 
the empirical context of OPD in India and South Africa. 
 
L A C U N A E  I N  C O M M O N  P A R T Y  S Y S T E M  R E S E A R C H  A N D  
T H E O R Y  
 
Recent research on party systems in changing societies, especially in those 
countries that were ‘affected’ by the “third wave” (Huntington 1991) of 
democratisation, calls into question some of the more fundamental theoretical 
knowledge on political parties and party systems that political scientists, 
entrenched in their western-based empirical referents, were so grown fond of. This 
is hardly to be wondered at since it would have been presumptuous to expect 
parties and party systems in changing societies to adjust their shape and role to the 
                                                                                                                            
as South Africa must be used with some qualifications. For a discussion of ‘alternation in 
office’ as a distinctive criterion for a political (party) system to be classified as democratic, 
see Huntington (1991: 263) and Przeworski and Limongi (1997). 
13 Sartori (1976: 196) in what remains to date the most sophisticated typology of party 
systems sets the criteria for his ‘predominant party system’ - the ‘rough’ equivalent to the 
one-party-dominant system referred to in this study - as three consecutive majorities of a 
party gaining absolute majority in parliament, but hastens to add that these sheer 
quantitative criteria look rather arbitrarily.  
14 As Thackrah (2000: 3) in a conceptual redefinition of OPD notes: “Indeed, the 
‘outdistancing’ phenomenon [a party system wherein one party outdistances all the others, 
C.S.] could potentially occur in all three systems [two-party, polarised and moderate 
pluralism, C.S.] (…). This suggests that predominance must also be accounted for on a 
different dimension, namely the existence of systems through time.” (italics mine). 
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analytical concepts and categories developed along the evolution of their western 
counterparts. Among the more important challenges to common party system 
theory are a) the inadequacies of some of the theoretical propositions made by the 
‘social cleavages’ approach pioneered by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), as well as the 
one-dimensionality of those too rigid attempts of institutionalism making law-like 
generalisations about the relationship between institutions and party systems 
without considering the respective context (for both critiques see e.g. Mainwaring 
1999, Merkel and Sandschneider 1997); b) the debate about a necessary pluralising 
and/or differentiation of the role and function of political parties and party systems 
with regard to an empirical setting that demands capacities from the political 
system going far beyond the ‘classic’ functions ascribed to parties and the party 
system in western democracies (e.g. McAllister and White 1995, Morlino 1995, 
Pridham and Lewis 1996, Schmitter 1999); and, c) the attempt to broaden and 
reshape common typologies of party systems on the basis of new insights in their 
structural functioning by incorporating broad, quantitatively measurable aspects of 
party systems’ institutionalisation as well as detailed, more qualitatively oriented 
accounts of a party systems’ much neglected vertical dimension, its intermediate 
position between the state and society as manifest in so called linkage studies (e.g. 
Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Kitschelt 1999). In a context where relevant loyalties 
and identities have to be produced afresh, conflict and contestation have to be co-
ordinated along so far unfamiliar institutional lines, and mobilisation and 
participation have to be channelled for the first time, the room to manoeuvre for 
political actors is naturally bigger, the institutional rules of the (democratic) game 
are not that clear, and the challenges for the representational system are different 
from those in the established democracies of western provenience. 
The closer look on OPD in changing societies, as well as on the distinct 
contexts – post-independent India and post-apartheid South Africa - this paper 
deals with, could enhance the understanding of parties and party systems in 
changing societies on the grounds that it has to handle a political manifestation and 
environment that have so far belied most of the assumptions made by common 
party and party system theory, that don’t exactly fit most of the prominent 
classifications of comparative research on party systems, and, that display two 
exemplary cases of democracy in changing societies: long-term survivals and post-
1990 (third wave) surfers. 
With regard to the lacunae or desiderata of party system theory described 
above the analysis of systems of OPD recommends itself for a very specific reason, 
namely, the relevance of strictly political factors for the emergence, working and 
effects of party systems in competitive democracies. In the words of Aran and 
Barnes (1974: 613): 
 
We suggest that the dominant party system is a political rather than 
sociological or psychological model. Because of its structural 
characteristics and the importance of strategic decisions as well as the 
impact it has on the competition, the mass public, and the organs of 
power, the dominant party model provides an alternative way of 
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understanding the emergence of competitive democracies in multiparty 
systems. 
 
P R O B L E M S  A N D  A D V A N T A G E S  O F  T H E  C O M P A R I S O N  
 
Now, why India and South Africa? What can they tell us about the functioning of 
OPD in changing societies? Is it only India and SA that display OPD as outlined 
above? Are they really comparable? 
Among changing societies, only India has so far succeeded in combining a long 
period of dominant party rule with liberal democracy (South Africa’s emerging 
system of OPD is still in the making). All other prominent examples of one-party 
domination in developing countries such as Mexico, Taiwan, Malaysia or 
Singapore - to name only those that are listed in the only comparative account of 
the subject to date, Giliomee and Simkins’ ‘Awkward Embrace’ - were either 
falling short of substantial standards of a liberal democracy as is the case with 
Taiwan, Mexico and Singapore15, or displayed a dominance of a complex (and less 
and less democratic since 1969) ruling coalition which was only loosely allied 
under the label of an umbrella party as is the case with Malaysia. Since the diverse 
patterns of interaction in a one-party-dominant system (or, for that matter, in any 
party system), Sartori’s ‘mechanics’, as well as the developmental capacity and 
strategic devices of political and party elites naturally differ in a context of free 
and, at least, partially fair contestation, India’s experience with OPD remains as the 
most fruitful value of comparison for the development of OPD in democratic post-
apartheid South Africa.16 This becomes even clearer if one relates the puzzle of 
democratisation to the well-known debate about the socio-economic prerequisites 
of democracy (Lipset 1960). As Merle Lipton notices in a review of Giliomee and 
Simkins’ ‘Awkward Embrace’: “SA [South Africa] is an intriguing example [of a 
                                                 
15 Dominant parties in Mexico, Taiwan or Singapore for the most part of their post-
independent history were pillars of authoritarian rule. Unlike in ‘true’ (democratic) one-
party-dominant systems, opposition parties faced serious official constraints or harassment, 
and, the ruling parties exploited the powers of office to maintain political support to the 
extent that the legal separation of party and state was blurred. Only recently, as a result of 
these countries’ long-term buoying economy, a process of far-reaching democratisation set 
in and furthered their transformation from ‘hegemonic’ party systems to one-party-
dominant or multi-party systems. Since India displayed a democratic set-up right from its 
inception as a one-party-dominant system whose success and resilience is blamed for being 
responsible for its poor developmental record by most observers, it offers a much more 
convincing point of comparison regarding the consequences of a (democratic) one-party-
dominant system on socio-economic development and democratic consolidation in the 
South African context. 
16 One could ask why not comparing the South African party system to Botswana’s political 
development? Since Botswana is always referred to as exceptional in the sub-Saharan 
context for it has successfully combined one-party-dominant rule with steady economic 
growth (and, to some extent, also fits the minimum standards of a liberal democracy), and, 
at the same time, shares a common regional setting, a comparison between the two 
neighbours seems rather obvious. But Botswana displays a very different level of societal 
complexity than South Africa and India and also shows a rather distinct lack of democratic 
control over the state bureaucracy (Holm 1996). 
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one-party dominant state, C. S.], both because of its inheritance of bitter racial 
conflict and because the per capita incomes of the black majority are below the 
level at which transitions to democracy generally occur. (However, while SA is 
unusual, it is not unique, and India, an even poorer democracy, would have 
provided an illuminating comparator.)” (Lipton 2000: 339). Behind this statement, 
the question arises whether a system of OPD is a possible institutional ‘container’ 
for the reconciliation of democracy and a low level of socio-economic 
development, or – to consider the other side of the medal - , whether a system of 
(democratic) OPD can only be upheld at the price of “peaceful stagnation”, 
according to Barrington Moore’s famous dictum about India’s post-independent 
development. (Moore 1966: 418 f.). 
Of course, a diachronic comparison between India and South Africa has to 
tackle the ostensibly lacking evidence needed to “establish the functional 
equivalence of different eras and political events” (Peters 1998: 73 f.). Since 
important context variables that have an impact on the party system’s emergence 
and working naturally differ over a time horizon of half a century (and a spatial 
distance of continental dimension), no effective control of the context is possible as 
would have been the case in a (synchronic) most similar systems design. 
Consequently, the modes of evolution and the substance of the two party systems 
under examination bear only a few similarities. In broad terms, these are the 
coming to power of the dominant party “in the wake of a nightmare”17 – colonial 
rule and apartheid, respectively -, and, the issues of national integration, 
democratic consolidation and socio-economic development (as the most pressing 
challenges the nascent democracies were/are facing). But, whereas the ‘roads’ to a 
system of OPD as well as the issues it reflects may be different as is the structural 
and institutional context of the respective regional settings, processes of political 
actors’ adaptation to different contexts and strategies of party competition display 
functional equivalence. It is a distinct process-orientation that makes a comparison 
along contextually different lines possible. For example, if we take the process of 
highlighting a certain cleavage by political actors through certain policy measures, 
or, the engagement of party elites in clientelist linkage mechanisms as starting 
point for an analysis of how party systems are shaped ‘from above’, the nature of 
the cleavage and the kind of material incentives involved are of secondary 
relevance, for the time being. It is the ‘mechanisms of control’ of the dominant 
party in the respective systems that are of interest.18 
                                                 
17 This expression stems from R. W. Johnson who was referring to the party systems of 
South Africa, Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia at a conference on One-Party Dominance in 
selected developing countries, Cape Town, 6-9 Nov. 1996, on which the ‘Awkward 
Embrace’ (Giliomee and Simkins 1999) is based. Although the end of colonial rule in India 
came with much more ease than in many other post-colonial states, the historical legacy of 
colonial oppression and resistance to it constituted the independent country’s determining 
founding myth. 
18 In the same vein, Levite and Tarrow (1983) in their reassessment of Arian and Barnes’ 
(1974) pioneering article on OPD in Italy and Israel describe the latters’ comparison as a 
“[unique effort] in the annals of comparative politics, for they boldly compared what was 
generally considered a centre-left dominant party, Mapai, with a centre-right one, the 
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Since these processes are most visible during the heyday of OPD, in the case of 
India, I will focus only on the period from 1952-67, commonly referred to as the 
‘Congress system’19 though reference to later developments of the Indian party 
system will be made in the last but one paragraph. In the case of South Africa, 
1990 is taken as a starting point, for the South African party system is basically a 
product of the transformation process, and, the ‘negotiated revolution’ taking place 
between 1990 and 1994 is crucial for the understanding of the later development of 
OPD in the country (see footnote 3). Conclusions concerning the South African 
system of OPD are necessarily limited by the ‘fluid’ conditions of a party system 
still in the making. 
 
T H E  R E G I O N A L  C O N T E X T :  O P D  I N  I N D I A  A N D  S O U T H  
A F R I C A  
 
The following brief depiction of the main constituents of the post-independence 
Indian and post-apartheid South African party systems, the dominant party and 
opposition parties, shall pave the ground for the analysis of how and why the 
emergence of OPD in both countries took place. 
 
D O M I N A N T  P A R T Y  
 
The dominant party as the nucleus of any system of OPD almost always presides 
over the creation of the polity and, in the case of India and South Africa, also stems 
from a year-long struggle as a liberation movement.20 Consequently, it has a bigger 
share of popular legitimacy at its disposal than any of its possible contenders and 
its strategy is determining in constitutional engineering. Whereas in India after 
partition there was no doubt that only the Congress could be in charge of 
dominating the political process and party landscape for it was the sole political 
movement practised in parliamentary politics and able to initiate state- and nation-
building, organise participation and mobilise the masses, the ANC had to compete 
with rival liberation organisations (Pan African Congress - PAC, Black 
Consciousness Movement - BCM), to build up an organisational network from the 
                                                                                                                            
Democrazia Christiana, arguing persuasively that – even in the face of their differences – 
the two parties had developed similar mechanisms of control.” (1983: 295). 
19 The term ‚Congress System’, connotative of the main conceptual and analytical features 
of India’s system of OPD, was first introduced to the scholarly community by Rajni 
Kothari (1961, 1964, 1974). Independently, W. H. Morris-Jones came to similar 
conclusions about the conceptual and analytical nature of India’s system of OPD, and, often 
used the same terminology as Kothari. See Morris-Jones (1966, 1967). Despite the electoral 
setback of the INC in the elections of 1967, the trend was reversed in the elections of 1971, 
1980 and 1984. Nevertheless, the elections of 1967 marked a change of perception in the 
electorate towards a stronger issue-orientation and evaluation of the performance of the 
governing party (Kothari 1975: 102), a change of opposition strategy based on the 
perception that INC dominance can be undermined, and, the beginning of a disintegration 
process of the INC that culminated in the split of 1969. 
20 In fact, the INC and ANC are the oldest liberation movements on their respective 
continents with the INC already founded in 1885 and the ANC in 1912. 
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fragments of its internal and exile wings, to weave together its different factions 
and, at the same time, it was confronted with opposition from parties representing 
the white minority some of them having already long experience in (exclusive) 
parliamentary politics. 
Nevertheless, the ANC was able to gain control of a fairly unified African 
electorate, to present itself as the primary bargaining partner of the ruling National 
Party and, in the course of the negotiation process that led to the first democratic 
elections of 1994, succeeded in ensuring pre-eminence over all other political 
forces in the country. 
Yet, in organisational terms the INC was much better prepared to electoral 
competition than the ANC visible from the fact that up to 1971 the number of 
candidates contesting Lok Sabha elections for the INC outdistanced the number of 
candidates of any of the opposition parties by more than 90%21. 
Both parties had gathered a mass following before independence and the end of 
apartheid respectively. Whereas the INC under Gandhi’s stewardship was 
extremely successful in mobilising India’s diverse interest groups and social strata 
to join the banner of the nationalist movement22, the ANC – after 30 years in exile 
and clandestinity – had to bring together in a single structure the adherents of the 
disparate segments of the liberation movement it was spearheading, symbolically at 
least.23 It must be seen as one of the many enigmas surrounding the transition to 
democracy how quick the ANC eventually succeeded in cementing together such a 
great range of social groups and ideological positions. It was a tough process 
comprising the launching of ‘rolling mass action’, hefty negotiations, and struggle 
over leadership with the founding of the ‘Tripartite Alliance’ (1990), the 
organisational manifestation of the ANC’s long-standing partnership with 
COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) and the SACP (South African 
Communist Party) as the most visible step towards an institutionalisation of the 
party’s broad support base. 
Both parties as well secured their political pre-eminence basically through 
presenting an image of moderation and inclusivity comprising broad-church, non-
sectarian politics; through mere survival and longevity providing some sort of a 
                                                 
21 Based on figures given in: Government of India (various years). Statistical Abstract 
India. New Delhi: Government of India Press. 
22 Gandhi was much more sceptical when it came to the task of making a shift from 
nationalist movement to political party immediately after independence had been achieved. 
On the eve of his assassination he was even arguing for the dissolution of the INC as a 
political organisation. Were it not for the pragmatic and passionate efforts of Patel and later 
Nehru to “tame the nationalist movement” (Weiner 1968: 36) and to build-up a viable 
political organisation, one could speculate whether the INC would have been able to 
achieve or maintain a dominant position in Indian politics for so many a years. 
23 As Lodge (1999: 2) notes on the liberatory character of the ‘democratic breakthrough’ in 
South Africa: “The ANC’s victory at the polls was not just the triumph of a political party. 
Rather it signified the political supremacy of a broader liberatory movement whose 
constituents included the ANC itself – an organisation which until its legalisation and 
homecoming 1990 had been constituted by a 15.000-strong exile body largely, though not 
exclusively, oriented to guerrilla warfare, and which by 1991 had built a branch structure 
inside South Africa embracing a membership of 500.000.” 
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symbolic capital often going beyond ordinary partisan attachment; and, through 
their character as a social alliance encompassing as broad a range of social 
formations as possible (Weiner 1968, Dube 2000). 
In terms of electoral dominance, as the table below shows, both parties’ 
performance matches the criteria of OPD in a strict numerical sense. The average 
difference between the two parties and the respective second largest party is far 
beyond the margin one normally finds in two- or multi-party systems. The effective 
number of parties, an index that weighs the relative size of parties, could be 
misleading for it gives the impression that we are dealing with two-party systems. 
But, taking into account the number of opposition parties that goes into that index, 
and, considering opposition fragmentation, the figures hint at the domination of the 
electoral process by the INC and ANC respectively. 
The extreme variation as regards the respective party systems average 
difference in vote/seat share is a clear indication of the distortions or ‘multiplier 
effect’ produced by the Indian FPTP electoral system. In terms of vote share the 
ANC is definitely more dominant electorally than  
 
Electoral data for India (1952-1967) and South Africa (1994-1999) 
 
INC/India ANC/South Africa 
Average vote/seat share (%) 44.6/69.2 64.5/64.75 
Average difference in vote/seat share (%) 24.65 0.25 
Average difference between largest and 
second largest party in terms of votes/seats (%) 
33/63.4 49.5/49.75 
Average effective number of parties (votes/seats)* 4.3/1.8 2.2/2.2 
Average volatility** 29.6*** 35.3**** 
Average Turnout 52.6 77.5***** 
Notes: 
* the effective number of parties (Laakso/Taagepera 1979) being sensitive to the relative sizes of 
parties, is calculated as follows:  
with pi as the vote/seat share of the i-party; only parties represented in parliament were counted. 
**Pedersen’s (1983) index of volatility counts the sum of net votes won/lost of relevant parties from 
one election to the next 
*** only parties with 2% or more of the vote share were counted 
**** only parties at least once represented in parliament were counted 
***** in the 1999 elections a registration of voters was conducted; the figure was calculated on the 
basis of % of eligible South Africans voting 
Source: Enskat/Mitra/Singh 2001 for India, Engel (1999) for South Africa 1994, Reynolds (1999) for 
South Africa 1999. 
∑
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the INC was, even during the heyday of OPD in India. In fact, the INC never won 
more than 50% of the popular vote throughout its history of electoral dominance; 
its governmental authority was always based on so called ‘manufactured 
majorities’. Nevertheless, when it comes to the proportion of parliamentary seats 
each party gained under their respective electoral systems as well as to the average 
difference between largest and second-largest party in terms of seats, the INC 
outdistances the ANC by a margin of nearly 5 and 14 percentage points 
respectively. 
Given the high average turnout which, in the case of India, is remarkable in 
view of its predominantly rural and illiterate electorate, the degree of volatility is 
relatively low compared to western democracies (it is extremely low considering 
the fact that between a founding and second election, voters’ orientations are often 
not yet fully developed, and, taking into account that a great deal of ‘new’ parties 
in successive elections had just changed their respective names). 
But the dominance of a party is also dependent on the state of the opposition 
parties, how they interact with the dominant party and what role they perform for 
the pattern of competition prevalent in a system of OPD. 
 
O P P O S I T I O N  
 
Despite opposition parties in a system of OPD having practically no chance to take 
power, they nevertheless have an essential function guaranteeing the 
competitiveness of the party system and determining the dominant party’s strategy. 
Except for the Communist and Hindu-Nationalist parties opposition politics in 
India during the first two decades after independence was essentially a matter of 
Congress factions no longer comfortable within the framework of the dominant 
party. In fact, apart from the Jana Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the 
Communist Party of India (CPI), most parties had lineages that could have been 
traced back to the INC. 
On the left side of the party spectre there were the Communists and the 
Socialists. The Communists, initially successful in increasing their vote share after 
independence, gradually lost momentum after the split of 1964 and remained 
relatively marginal in Indian politics except for their regional strongholds in West 
Bengal and Kerala. The electoral career of the Socialists, once a faction within the 
INC, is characterised by a succession of various mergers and splits often induced 
by the INC party leadership. Up to the elections of 1971 there were four relevant 
socialist parties competing with the ‘democratic socialism’ of the INC. Despite 
minor electoral successes they were never able to entrench themselves in the Indian 
party system in the long run. 
On the right side of the party spectre, if one applies the categories derived from 
European party sociology, there were the Hindu Nationalists in form of the Jana 
Sangh, the parliamentary arm of the RSS and predecessor of the BJP, and the 
Swatantra Party, founded in 1956. The Swatantra, originally a faction within the 
INC as well, attempted to countervail left-leaning tendencies within the INC and 
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gave itself the image of the only ‘truly liberal’ party in India at that time. It was 
able to gain support among the INC clientele in the elections of 1962 and 1967, but 
– after massive losses in 1971 – finally disappeared from Indian party politics. 
Apart from these main opposition parties which - together with the INC - won 85% 
of the popular vote on average in the first four elections after independence, there 
were a plethora of regional parties which were of minor relevance for the 
composition of the Lok Sabha, but, nonetheless, had an impact on the national 
party system through their electoral successes on the regional level. 
In South Africa, the situation is different. There, the party system is largely the 
product of the transformation process. All the established parties of the South 
African party system as well as the nationally relevant movements and anti-
apartheid groups were deeply affected by the political reform process initiated by 
president De Klerk. Most of the formerly banned parties or movements – like the 
ANC or PAC - representing the African majority were for the first time confronted 
with preparing themselves for electoral competition, taking part in the elaboration 
of a constitution and making themselves available for government responsibility, in 
sum, they had to think about the future shape of the country and their role within its 
political system. For the parties of the ancièn regime, i.e. the nationally relevant 
parties representing the white minority apart from the Democratic Party (DP), it 
meant to learn the ropes of opposition politics. For some time, the National Party 
(NP) as the prime representative of the apartheid regime had to display an 
oppositional stand toward the ANC while, at the same time, sitting in cabinet due 
to the provision of a ‘Government of National Unity’ (GNU) until the elections of 
1999 according to section 88 of the interim constitution. The participation of the 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) – once entrenched in bitter rivalry to the ANC - in the 
GNU outlived the provisions of section 88 of the interim constitution. Although 
there was no need for the ANC as the majority party to share governmental power 
after the 1999 elections, the IFP retained its three cabinet seats in the newly formed 
government under Thabo Mbeki. ‘White’ opposition tried to redefine their image 
and to concentrate their electoral strength. The NP was renamed shortly before the 
elections of 1999 (New National Party – NNP) and in 2000 DP and NNP 
announced that they were joining together as the Democratic Alliance (DA). But 
the latter attempt was short-lived. Just one year later, the DA split thus reinforcing 
opposition fragmentation once again. Apart from these three main opposition 
parties (NNP, DP (DA) and IFP), the United Democratic Front (UDM) – led by 
former Transkei military chief Bantu Holomisa and the NP’s chief negotiator Roelf 
Meyer - emerged as a fourth party in the last elections winning 14 parliamentary 
seats with a strong performance in the Eastern Cape province. 
Now, taking into account the two countries socio-structural givens and 
electoral systems, the following conclusions could have been drawn in accordance 
with theoretical reasoning within common party system theory: Simplified, in the 
case of India the institutionalist - inspired by ‘Duverger’s Law’ - would argue that 
due to the electoral system of SMSP/FTPT a two-party system should have 
emerged, whereas the scholar in the tradition of Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage 
theory would say that due to the abundant profusion of social cleavages, the party 
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system is foreordained to extreme fragmentation or even atomisation.24 In the case 
of South Africa, the institutionalist would say that due to PR the party system 
should necessarily be characterised by a proliferation of a plethora of political 
parties, whereas the sociologist would argue that the overarching racial cleavage 
inevitably leads to a party system structured along the arithmetic of the racial 
census. Except for the sociologist in the South African case all other scholars’ 
arguments were proven wrong empirically. And, even the sociologist could be 
accused of not being accurate in his analysis of the South African electorate for 
there are many more cleavages prevalent in South African society than just race 
and it is by now part and parcel of scholarly knowledge that South Africa is made 
up of several different ‘societies’.25 
Now, one could argue that the determinism inherent in these two theoretical 
approaches has long been overcome and that the structuring effects on the party 
system of either political institutions or the socio-structural make-up of a society 
depend heavily on other intervening variables and aspects of the specific regional 
context. But this would mean to open the door to some form of cultural relativism 
and singular explanation, something no political scientist would agree with. 
Instead, the next paragraph will argue that despite institutionally and structurally so 
different contexts strategic choices and decisions made by the respective dominant 
parties’ leadership were crucial for the ‘achievement’ of OPD, and, it will 
introduce party agency as the ‘missing link’ necessary to explain the similarity in 
the historical outcome  
 
T H E  ‘ A C H I E V E M E N T ’  O F  O P D  I N  I N D I A  A N D  S O U T H  
A F R I C A  
 
The question of ‘how a system of OPD emerged in the two countries’ demands a 
multi-layered answer comprising an intricate mix of institutional, structural and 
party agentive factors. Clearly, the ‘history of struggle’ both parties were identified 
with in no small part contributed to the initial electoral dominance of the INC and 
ANC. The fact that the memory of this history was coupled with the charismatic 
leadership of Nehru and Mandela reinforced both parties’ electoral appeal even 
more.26 
                                                 
24 This is in line with the general scholarly prediction about India’s territorial integrity and 
democratic career at the time sociological interpretations of democratisation gained 
prominence, see, for example, Harrison (1960: 338). 
25 Additionally, several surveys conducted from the first elections in 1994 onwards show 
that race is not only no longer the primary source of social identity, but also that its 
relevance for party identification is less important than presumed (see, for example, data on 
South Africa collected by the ‘Institute for a Democratic South Africa’  
(IDASA, http://www.idasa.org.za) as part of the ‘Afrobarometer’ project 
(http://www.afrobarometer.org), and Mattes et al. (1995, p. 390); Mattes and Piombo 
(2001). 
26 In this vein, two early quotes by Nehru and Mandela respectively are revealing (they also 
refer to the two respective parties’ movement character, a rhetorical device quite often used 
to reinsure their claim to legitimacy and governance): 
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But, even in the formative phase of a party system, the symbolic capital derived 
from this ‘history of struggle’ and charismatic leadership is not sufficient to 
guarantee the dominant party’s control over the electorate. 
However, the room to manoeuvre for party elites in nascent democracies is 
bigger and they can have a profound impact on party system formation. Whereas 
most of the literature implicitly sees party system formation as reflecting society, 
the following suggests a top-down approach. 
That is why systems of OPD are to some extent ‘achieved’ and not entirely 
emanating only from society when in fact they were often structured from above. 
There are basically three factors or processes that were crucial for this 
‘achievement’ of OPD in India and South Africa: 
First, the dominant party right from the beginning has to initiate a ‘historic 
project’ that determines the national public policy agenda and lays the roots for a 
long-lasting support base (Pempel 1990: 340 ff.). Some kind of a programmatic 
appeal which, by telling the mass electorate that the governing party will transform 
their lives, guarantees a deep identification between the dominant party and a 
majority in the electorate. 
In India this ‘historic project’ was centred around a national consensus 
comprising the well-known ingredients of secularism, democratic socialism, mixed 
economy, non-alignment and nationalism. Apart from the symbolic value attached 
to this ‘national ideology’27 - partly institutionalised in form of the Directive 
Principles enshrined in the constitution and the independent planning commission –
, two components of this consensus were crucial. On the one hand, the secular ideal 
of the INC’s policy guaranteed the alignment of the Muslim constituency to the 
                                                                                                                            
The Congress necessarily has to function as an electoral organisation, but that 
is not its only or its most important task. It has been our proud privilege to be 
the soldiers in a mighty national movement which brought freedom to this 
country. We cannot allow Congress to shrink now into just an electoral 
organisation (…) Our party organisation must be something more than a party. 
It must win confidence and respect by patient and self-sacrificing service, and 
thus live in the hearts of our people. 
Nehru in The Statesman, New Delhi, 23 January 1954. 
 
The ANC has never been a political party. It was formed as a parliament of 
the African people. Right from the start, up to now, the ANC is a coalition, if 
you want, of people of various political affiliations. Some will support free 
enterprise, others socialism. Some are conservatives, others are liberals. We 
are united solely by our determination to oppose racial oppression. That is the 
only thing that unites us. There is no question of ideology as far as the 
odyssey of the ANC is concerned, because any question approaching ideology 
would split the organization from top to bottom. Because we have no 
connection whatsoever except this one, our determination is to dismantle 
apartheid. 
Mandela in The Washington Post, Washington, 26 June 1990. 
 
27 As Kothari (1970: 144) notes: “Harping constantly and in an almost tiresome manner on 
the themes of democracy, socialism, planning, non-involvement in power-blocs, and related 
ideas, he [Nehru] created a framework of discourse which laid the semantic and symbolic 
basis of national unity.” 
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party; on the other hand, politics of social reform, especially the institutionalisation 
of reservations and quota, secured the support of the socially oppressed, i.e. the 
untouchables. 
Together with the regionally dominant castes that were allied to the INC for 
other reasons (see below) these groups constituted one third of the Indian 
electorate, a vote pool that – coupled with the specific conditions of the Indian 
electoral system – almost always guaranteed electoral majority. 
In South Africa, party leadership within the ANC was well aware that the 
envisaged building of an idealised ‘rainbow nation’ would not be sufficient to 
guarantee the symbolic capital necessary to continued monopolisation of the 
national agenda. That is why shortly after the elections of 1994 the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP) was launched, a “co-ordinated, centrally 
planned and interlocking approach to the national upliftment of the formerly 
disadvantaged” (Schlemmer 1999: 290). Although the subsequent suspension of 
the RDP (1996) and the adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
programme (GEAR), basically a neo-liberal and pro-capitalist macro-economic 
framework, contributed to a decrease in credibility of the governing party in terms 
of its capacity to ‘deliver’, and, at the same time, produced tensions within the 
tripartite alliance, the RDP reassured the dominant party’s support base of its good 
intentions and the ANC has nevertheless remained firmly committed to affirmative 
action and the social transformation of the society. 
Second, party elites have to ensure that the institutional arrangement of the 
polity works in the favour of the dominant party which means that there are 
guarantees that the dominant party is in a position to play its organisational 
advantage and electoral dominance off against opposition parties. 
Whereas in India, INC leaders – cognisant of the fact that they would benefit 
from the Westminster FTPT electoral system as long as opposition remained 
fragmented and in a cumbersome organisational state – did not consider alternative 
electoral regimes, they sought provisions for giving Indian federalism a unitary 
shape in order to alter developments of the party system to their favour whenever 
necessary as was the case with the imposition of President’s rule on the CPI 
government of Kerala in 1959. But – despite the opportunities of control by the 
Centre inherent in Indian federalism – the INC under Nehru’s leadership opted for 
some kind of ‘co-operative federalism’ whereby party leadership intervened 
whenever factional disputes in the states threatened to go off the rails, but, at the 
same time, gave the states enough autonomy to manage conflicts on their own 
without endangering the authority of the central government. This co-operative 
federalism was further reinforced by the states reorganisation which was 
accompanied by a gradual regionalisation of the Congress apparatus as well. In the 
course of this process, the INC succeeded in co-opting regionally dominant castes 
and village authorities thus broadening its already vast support base. 
In South Africa, interestingly enough, the ANC opted for an electoral system 
that ran counter to its partisan interests, for a first-past-the-post system would have 
clearly benefited the ANC as the putative majority party. The option for an 
electoral system of proportional representation, however, can be seen either as an 
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example of the ANC’s goodwill for compromise28 or ideological commitment to 
integrate as many societal groups as possible into the political system (see, for 
example, Sisk 1994: 12, and Pottie 2001: 154), or, as an indication that the ANC – 
cognisant of the fact that it would yield enough electoral support to overcome the 
power-sharing requirements of the interim constitution – was, nevertheless, geared 
towards establishing majority rule (Mattes 1994: 7, Sisk 1995: 190), in other words 
to turn South Africa into what was once termed by Nelson Mandela as a “normal 
democracy as the world knows it”29. The adoption of PR gained attraction for the 
ANC for yet another reason: On the one hand, the closed-list variant of PR was 
adopted which meant that ultimately it is the party leadership which decides who 
will be nominated as a candidate for contesting elections thus enabling the party to 
‘punish’ rebellious or unpopular MP’s. On the other hand, a corollary of the South 
African electoral system is the prohibition on floor-crossing or anti-defection law, a 
further encouragement to stay within the dominant party in order to ‘share the 
fruits of power’.30 
To be clear, electoral systems or federal arrangements do little to explain OPD 
(Esping-Andersen: 1990: 57), but as institutional incentives they can reinforce 
OPD if the “politician of the dominant part (…) makes the appropriate 
decisions…” (Arian and Barnes 1974: 614). 
Finally, party leaders and activists of the dominant party must be engaged as 
entrepreneurs on the electoral market meaning they must actively seek support in 
the most pragmatic fashion available. This involves both, the positioning of the 
image of the party in such a way that it yields the greatest electoral appeal, and, the 
recruitment of leaders with strong local or regional followings. 
The ability of the INC to secure ‘vote-banks’ is well-known. Clientelist 
linkages pervaded the local and regional party structure and a process of ‘vertical 
mobilisation’ (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967) gained momentum. At the same time, 
INC tactics comprised the depoliticisation of potential cleavages through 
accommodation like, for example, the abolition of the zamindari system or the 
abovementioned states reorganisation, and, the widest possible variability and 
pragmatism in terms of its ideological orientation just depending on a swing of the 
pendulum in public opinion. Thus, changing issue positions allowed the INC to 
occupy the middle-ground of the ideological spectre and to react selectively to the 
rise of oppositional forces. To give an example, its Avadi resolution of 1955 
oriented towards a ‘socialistic pattern of society’ took away from the socialist 
parties a good deal of their rationale, and, when the Swatantra party tried to 
mobilise peasants against the INC’s land reforms, it easily modified its politics of 
co-operative farming to defuse the protest. 
                                                 
28 Lijphart (1994: 229) even goes further, stating that „The ANC’s high-minded stance on 
PR runs completely counter to the conventional wisdom that political parties act on the 
basis of their narrow partisan self-interests – putting political scientists who operate on this 
assumption to shame!” 
29 Quote from ‚FW Briefs Leaders on Plans for Multi-Party Talks’, in: Argus. 5 November 
1991, p. 1. 
30 See Giliomee and Simkins (1999: 16): “Indeed, it [the closed PR list electoral formula] 
suited the ANC so well that it would have had to invent it if it did not exist.” 
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The situation in South Africa is different. Whereas in India the successful strategy 
of the INC involved the ‘muting’ of potential cleavages in order to preserve its 
image as the catch-all ‘party of consensus’, a strategy of encouraging the racial 
consolidation of the vote must be seen as the best (and most rational) option that 
was and is at offer for the ANC to perpetuate its electoral dominance. Despite 
multiple potential cleavages other than racial and a growing African middle-class 
there is still an overwhelming coincidence of race and class that underpins a 
common perception of a ‘Black-White’, ‘Rich-Poor’ dichotomy. The ANC 
capitalises on this dichotomy that papers over genuine cleavages of the South 
African society by delineating all of the country’s inequalities in racial terms and 
evoking emotive support for the ‘continuing struggle’ against the legacies of 
apartheid. This strategy is made easier by the fact that the NNP and DP are 
basically pandering to their non-African constituencies, and, the IFP, unable to gain 
a majority of the vote even among its most obvious pool of supporters, Zulus, has 
joined Mbeki in declaring that the ‘race’ divide is also the ‘inequality’ divide for 
the sake of sharing power within an ANC-led government. 
But the ANC also tries to co-opt local elites by giving them promising 
positions in the party’s candidate lists. This was evident in the Western Cape 
province before the 1999 elections as the ANC attempted to broaden its support 
base by appealing to the province’s Coloured communities. 
One can deduct from the foregoing that against common academic wisdom and 
party system theory the role that party agentive factors play in the genesis and 
structuring of the two party systems under examination is clearly a crucial 
explanatory factor when it comes to the question of how a distinct party system is 
shaped and much more valuable than any kind of structural or institutional 
determinism. 
In the two cases it was or is basically parties’ initiative in terms of political 
actors and party leaders acting as determinant agents of institutional arrangements 
and policies as well as entrepreneurs on the electoral market that accounts for a 
great deal of the formation of a system of OPD. 
Neither social cleavage theory, nor institutional determinism leave enough 
room to manoeuvre for party elites and political actors, or, in other words, give 
strictly political factors and party agency the explanatory power they deserve 
within party system theory, at least in the context of changing societies. 
The preceding corresponds to the view formulated by Arian and Barnes (1974: 
599) in their seminal article on OPD in Italy and Israel: 
 
(…) in many multiparty systems, parties are the result of historical and 
social forces and are only partially the conscious creation of political 
leaders. And in single party systems, only organizational inadequacies 
set limits on the exercise of power. The dominant party system is one 
in which politics is king, in which dominance results from strategic 
political decisions made by the party elite. Politics is not a dependent 
variable. Political strategy is determining. 
 
CLEMENS SPIEß 
 
19 
M A I N T E N A N C E  O F  O P D  I N  I N D I A  A N D  S O U T H  A F R I C A :  
M E C H A N I S M S  O F  C O N T R O L  A N D  C O M P E T I T I O N  
 
The foregoing may account for the emergence or founding of OPD in the 
respective regional contexts but cannot explain continued dominance and gives 
only a slight indication of the mechanisms of control and competition at work in a 
system of OPD. 
How and why is the dominant party able to maintain dominance after the 
euphoria of freedom has worn off, or, in other words, how is it able to countervail 
the inherent dynamics of OPD once described by Duverger (1954: 312) as follows:  
 
Domination takes the zest from political life, simultaneously bringing 
stability. The dominant party wears itself out in office, it loses its 
vigour, its arteries harden. It would be possible to show that every 
domination bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction.31 
 
There are basically four processes of constant fine-tuning and adaptation to 
changing social conditions whereby dominant parties attempt to ensure continued 
dominance and try to determine the further development of the party system. 
The following thereby also hints at the qualitative criteria or systemic constituents 
of a system of OPD that should be part of any classification or typology of OPD in 
the context of changing societies. 
In the Indian case, there is already a prominent interpretative model at hand to 
account for the internal dynamics of the party system in the two decades following 
independence. The concept of the ‘Congress system’ as pioneered by Kothari and 
Morris-Jones (see footnote 18) neatly grasps the logic of two of the four processes 
of maintaining dominance elaborated below. 
 
I n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  O p p o s i t i o n  
 
The first of these processes is the specific interaction with opposition parties taking 
place in a system of OPD. Opposition parties can either be co-opted or tolerated 
within certain limits or delegitimised (Levite and Tarrow 1983: 295 ff.). Often, 
several strategies are employed simultaneously, but all of them serve as strategic 
device to reinforce dominance and perpetuate vertical party interaction 
characterised by patterns of (moral) domination rather than competition.  
In India, the basic pattern of interaction with opposition was toleration within 
certain limits or, in the words of Kothari (1964: 1162), opposition parties were 
                                                 
31 In the same vein, Morris-Jones described the paradox of post-independent OPD in the 
Indian context: “(…) to dominate, Congress [Indian National Congress, C. S.] must 
accommodate; yet accommodation encourages incoherence which destroys the capacity to 
dominate.” (Morris-Jones 1978 (1966): 224). A contradictory point of view is given by 
Pempel (1990: 16) who argues that OPD is characterised by reinforcing processes of the 
interrelationship between its causes and consequences creating a “virtuous cycle of 
dominance” where office achieved through a dominant position is used to ensure further 
dominance. 
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allowed to act as ‘parties of pressure’ on the ‘party of consensus’ thus exerting a 
‘latent threat’ on the dominant party and, at the same time, making it sensitive to 
waning popular support. Opposition parties thereby lobbied factions within the 
dominant party in order to articulate specific interests32, and, whenever a Congress 
faction or opposition party came to close to openly opposing the mainstream 
Congress position, their success or failure served as a barometer which the INC 
noticed for evidence that it is bending too much in a certain direction.33 But, when 
this form of ‘internalised opposition’ was not at offer for reasons of ideological 
distance or electoral success of opposition in the states, the INC – apart from what 
Hardgrave (1980: 150) has described as “undermining the opposition, taking over 
their programs, conceding basic issues, and co-opting their leadership” – also fell 
back on direct intervention in terms of exclusion or imposing President’s rule on 
opposition governments whenever necessary. 
Delegitimisation of opposition is much more prominent in South African party 
politics, at least rhetorically. Although co-optation of opposition parties takes 
place, most visible in the case of the IFP, the ANC’s stand towards the opposition 
is basically one of denying them any credibility to criticise the governing alliance. 
However, as Friedman (1999: 111) points out, “Harsh rhetoric is not necessarily 
delegitimisation: to fulfil the latter criterion, ruling party denunciations must 
question the opposition’s loyalty to the democratic order.” There have been attacks 
of this sort on the NP34 and DP (DA), - even on the IFP before 1994 - but they still 
occur at the rhetoric level only. But delegitimisation takes places in another, yet 
related field of political discourse, one that was of no importance during the heyday 
of OPD in India: Since 1997 the ANC government is increasingly making the 
claim that media coverage of the government and party, particularly of Mbeki, is 
still based on racial stereotypes; the effect of such claims on the exercise of press 
freedom could be devastating. 
                                                 
32 See Kothari (1970: 305): „One [of the characteristics of the INC as a full-fledged party 
system] has been the peculiar communication system of Indian politics by which the 
position of each of the major opposition parties has been reflected in one or another of the 
factions within the Congress Party: the socialist faction, the Swatantra faction, the Jan 
Sangh faction, and so on.” 
33 Apart from the ‚watchdog’ role described by Kothari, the Congress system did not deem 
subordinate parties superfluous for yet another reason. As Burger (1969: 284) notes: 
 
The most important function that opposition parties play is as ‘feeder’ 
organisations to the dominant party. A dominant party is not necessarily an 
‘open accordion’. It may be that the dominant party can open its ranks to new 
groups only when they have become politically significant – which means 
previous to entry. Opposition parties in Uttar Pradesh could be perennial 
minority parties, serving to socialise, politicise, recruit, organise, integrate and 
articulate the interests of groups only to see them incorporated into the 
dominant party. 
 
34 Attacks on the legitimacy of the NP as the party which introduced and implemented 
apartheid, come close to a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. 
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To some extent, the ANC has ‘internalised’ opposition as well by forging its 
potential left contenders, the SACP and COSATU, into a fragile but yet coherent 
alliance. 
 
Both, the INC and ANC, justify attempts of delegitimisation by projecting 
themselves as the embodiment of an all-inclusive nationalism and the only political 
force capable in bringing about ‘transformation’. There is a striking similarity 
between Nehru’s famous dictum that “The Congress is the country and the country 
is Congress”35 and its implicit meaning, and, the statement of the ANC’s National 
Executive Council that “As the organisation of the people, it is our responsibility to 
ensure that [the] masses use the precious democratic rights they won through 
struggle, to determine their own destiny (...) Once again, only our movement, and 
no other political formation, is capable of carrying out this national mobilisation.36 
 
S e l e c t i v e  M o b i l i s a t i o n  
 
The second process of ensuring control over the electorate is selective mobilisation. 
Selective mobilisation as described by Arian and Barnes (1974: 598) leads the 
dominant party to ‘focus its mobilisational efforts on those segments of society that 
are going to make fewer demands on government.’  
Selective mobilisation involves basically two processes: purchasing support by 
positive discrimination of or granting resources to certain societal groups, and, 
                                                 
35 Quoted in Morris-Jones (1964: 90). 
36 Statement of the National Executive Committee of the ANC on the 87th Anniversary of 
the African National Congress, January 8 1999. Available under 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/jan8-99.html. Even today, the INC is following a 
similar line of reasoning as apparent from the Golden Jubilee Resolution of 1997: 
 
The Indian National Congress, alone of all political parties of our democracy, 
belongs to all of the country. There is not a village in India, not a mohalla, 
where there is not a Congress presence. That presence rises and falls --that is 
the essence of democracy. But the essence of nation-building is that no section 
of the people must feel that there is not a place for them in the premier 
political party, the natural party of governance. Other parties represent a 
region, a class, a creed, a caste, an interest. The Congress alone represents, 
and is represented in, every region, every class, every creed, every caste --and 
in every interest which is in the interest of the nation. That is why, whenever 
the Congress has secured the people's mandate to govern the country, it has 
never faltered in fulfilling its mandate to the end, and that is also why 
whenever any other party or group of parties has been entrusted by the people 
with the duty of governance, they have never failed to falter, falling out 
among themselves in a matter of months, endangering the unity, the security, 
the progress and the prosperity of this great nation. The Congress is the glue, 
the bonding adhesive, that holds the polity of this country together. 
 
Golden Jubilee Resolution passed at the 80th Plenary session of the INC in August 1997 at 
Calcutta; see Congress Marches Ahead (Jan 1996-December 1997), AICC publication 
(April 1998), p.160. 
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aggregating a large range of interest in society but giving voice only to certain 
spokesman of these interests. 
Apart from the positive discrimination of the socially disadvantaged and 
ideological appeal to the minorities already mentioned, the INC initially did 
concentrate mobilisational efforts at creating a labour aristocracy based on its 
policy of planned and state-induced industrialisation and advancement of the urban 
sector. Support was basically purchased by turning unionised workers into a labour 
elite with better wages, subsidised credit, housing and health care etc. Additionally, 
the INC successfully secured support from one of the two national umbrella 
organisations of Indian unions, the Indian Trade Union Congress (INTUC). 
Although the electoral dividend of this strategy was not overwhelming due to a 
rather incremental industrialisation, it nevertheless prevented a unified and 
nationally relevant workers’ party from gaining momentum.37 
But one of the essentials of continued electoral dominance is a “progressive 
expansion” (Mitra 1996: 706) of the dominant party’s social base. In a 
predominantly agrarian society this requires a concentrated effort at mobilising 
peasants and dominant agrarian castes. Although the INC was able to represent 
agrarian interests within its fold, visible from the fact that the share of MP’s with a 
rural background rose from 15% in 1947 to 40% in 1962 (Rosen 1967: 73), it never 
really succeeded in winning over the agrarian vote by means of selective 
mobilisation comprising extensive land reform, social programmes and 
development of the agrarian sector. 
Corporatism as strategic device to bind workers to the dominant party and not 
to intimidate business interests is much more prominent in the South African 
context given the size of organised labour in the country (one third of formal sector 
workers). The corporatist arrangement is institutionalised in form of the National 
Economic and Development and Labour Advisory Council (NEDLAC) and gives 
the ANC the opportunity to actively pursue selective mobilisation. Union-friendly 
labour legislation or near monopolies for large white-controlled corporations 
ensure the support of the economically satisfied. With COSATU as part of the 
ruling alliance union demands stay within limits. At the same time, a growing 
African middle-class is advanced through affirmative action in the civil service and 
through state contracts (Giliomee and Simkins 1999: 345). 
The Achilles Heel of the ANC’s ‘progressive expansion’ of its social base are 
the rural poor and unemployed. Whether the ANC will be able to prevent the rise 
of an intra-African cleavage (what it tries to do by counting all Africans being part 
of a the ‘majority’) will to a great extent depend on the status of ‘delivery’. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Another strategic device of the INC/state’s control over union demands was described by 
Rudolph and Rudolph (1987: 257) as “involuted pluralism” whereby a state-induced 
multiplication of rival trade unions makes it easier for the state “to manipulate an increasing 
number of weaker units.” 
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F a c t i o n a l i s m  a n d  P a r t y  C o h e r e n c e  
 
But selective mobilisation is not enough to ensure the dominant party’s aspiration 
and rationale to “make its support structure coterminous with the entire politically 
relevant public” (Singh 1981: 27). For that purpose the organisational set-up of the 
dominant party must allow internal pluralism or factionalism to ensure the 
representation of societal interests as diverse as the social make-up of the country, 
but, at the same time, the level of party coherence should not drop below a certain 
limit. From a systemic perspective factionalism also guarantees the 
competitiveness of the system and compensates for a lack of alternation in 
government: Where inter-party competition is weak, there is a need for equivalents 
that countervail the rise of authoritarian decision-making. 
Factionalism within the INC was an art far more than an inevitability. On the 
one hand, it allowed the INC to absorb, accommodate and react to diverging 
societal interest. The existence of vertical “faction chains” (Kothari: 1964: 1163) 
thereby enhanced the INC’s capacity to channel and co-ordinate conflicts. 
Factional struggles on a lower level of governmental or intra-party decision-
making were solved through authority and patronage from the next-upper level, 
factional struggles in the upper echelons of government or party were solved by 
building coalitions through deal-making on a lower level. On the other hand, 
factionalism guaranteed a high degree of elite-turnover38 and informal ‘internal 
democracy’. The most prominent example of factionalism and its functionality for 
the INC was the rivalry between organisational wing and parliamentary wing. As 
Mitra (1990: 85) pointed out: “The parliamentary wing publicly identified itself 
with the basic values of secularism, bureaucracy planning, nonalignment and 
egalitarianism which formed the basis of the modern state. The organisational wing 
acted as the intermediary between the state and the society, modifying the 
‘primordial’ to suit the ‘modern’ and adapting modern institutions to the norms of a 
traditional society.” 
But party leadership always had to be aware of the potential dangers inherent in 
factionalism and to intervene whenever factional tendencies threatened to get out 
of control. The famous clash of the INC’s governing elite and the ‘Syndicate’ or 
the conflict over the succession of Shastri were first signs of the gradual decline of 
the intricate factional balance prevalent during the heyday of OPD in India. 
Factionalism in South Africa is to some extent institutionalised in form of the 
Tripartite Alliance of the ANC, COSATU and SACP. Additionally, the close 
linkage between the ANC and civil society stemming from the shared experience 
of the anti-apartheid struggle reinforces the tradition of the movement’s often loud 
diversity. 
But, in contrast to the INC, the different factions within the ruling alliance are 
mainly of an ideological nature. On the one hand, this is a guarantee that not every 
personal ambition is translated into a faction. On the other hand, if there are major 
policy shifts, factional conflicts can go off the rails more easily. The recent 
tensions within the alliance over the adoption of GEAR bear witness of this fact. 
                                                 
38 An example of this kind of informal elite-rotation was the Kamaraj plan of 1963. 
CLEMENS SPIEß 
 
24 
And, with the gradual gaining of power of the exile wing within the ANC – 
personalised in the ascendancy of Thabo Mbeki – emphasis on party discipline in 
the tradition of an exile movement has gained momentum. Much will depend on 
reducing centralist tendencies to ensure that the tacit agreement on ‘unity’ within 
the alliance will endure for the foreseeable future. 
In terms of representativeness of the governing elite, the ANC is basically 
pursuing the same strategy as the INC (Nicholson 1975). In principle, the PR list 
electoral system gives the party leadership a strong instrument at hand to impose 
discipline on its cadres, but, rather, the ANC has used this device to display its 
readiness to represent every section of South African society. In the words of 
Giliomee and Simkins (1999: 17): “The ANC has forestalled criticisms of a black 
bias by drawing up its party list in such a way that 30 per cent of those elected to 
Parliament come from the coloured, Indian and white communities despite the fact 
that these communities contributed only six per cent to the overall ANC vote.” 
 
S t a t e - p a r t y  c o l l u s i o n  a n d  p a t r o n a g e  
 
I’ll vote for the opposition when they are in power39 
 
The last and often most prominent of these four processes is the gradual attempt of 
the dominant party to blur the line between it and the state. This is done for two 
reasons: On the one hand, it facilitates the bestowal of patronage on the dominant 
party’s clientele. On the other hand, identification with the state to some extent 
becomes synonymous with identification with the dominant party. 
In India patronage politics were favoured by what has been termed as “state-
dominated pluralism” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 255). The omnipresence of the 
state and the effect of the close liaison between the INC and government agencies 
on partisan attachment is illustrated by Morris-Jones (1978: 222) as follows: 
 
(…) every group that seeks new advantages and amelioration of its 
position  must above all try to ensure that its voice is heard in the 
counsels of government. The level of government that is most relevant 
varies according to the kind of benefit that is sought: for a private 
commercial licence, it is the Center; for educational concessions for a 
caste bloc, it will be the State, for this or that development benefit for a 
cultivator, it will be, increasingly, the new indirectly elected local 
bodies such as the Panchayati Samiti. For these operations one must 
have friends who can influence people. Congress is such a body of 
organised friends. 
 
The second factor that facilitated a patronage structure was the existence of 
traditional clientelist institutions like the jajmani system of reciprocal bonds 
between status bearers and clientele. Often, these were the base for the dominant 
                                                 
39 Anonymous Serb peasant cited by Timothy Garton Ash. Quoted in Gilomee and Simkins 
(1999: 337) 
CLEMENS SPIEß 
 
25 
party’s organisation of political machines corresponding to Arian and Barnes’ 
(1974: 601) view that “(…) these [hierarchical] lines of communication, extended 
and humanized by networks of personal ties, are the true instruments of control in 
the societies, and they are largely co-opted by the dominant party.” 
Blurring the line between the state and the dominant party is a standard device 
of the ANC’s rhetoric. By equating the ANC’s historic mission of ‘transformation’ 
of the society with the South African state’s rationale, ANC leaders and 
government spokespeople are very ready to view criticisms and even legal 
challenges to their authority as evidence of conspirational resistance to 
transformation (Lodge: 1999: 73). Characterising opposition as ‘unpatriotic’ leaves 
little room to manoeuvre, since every attack on the ANC comes close to an assault 
on the state. 
But patronage politics while part of the ANC’s strategy to widen its support 
base is constrained by the limited reach of the South African state and the ANC’s 
embrace of a market economy. Given the limited opportunity of the ANC to rely 
on a strong interventionist state makes the expansion of distributive politics more 
difficult and even more dangerous taking into account that, whereas a dominant 
party must distribute enough to its support base to retain its loyalty, it must also 
ensure “that its opponent’s supporters derive enough from public administration to 
ensure their continued loyalty to the democratic order.” (Friedman 1999: 104). 
 
S O U T H  A F R I C A  T U R N S  I N D I A :  W H A T  W A Y  A H E A D ?  
 
Despite the similarity in the historical outcome - a competitive party system 
structured around the electoral and ideological dominance of one party that is seen 
as the primary embodiment of an all-inclusive nationalism -, and the similarity in 
processes of control and competition inherent in the working of the two respective 
party systems as elaborated above, there are three intervening variables that have a 
crucial impact on the strategy of the dominant party and the working of the system: 
The first one is the level of political awareness and political penetration of the 
electorate. Political apathy and lack of interest in political matters serves the 
dominant party, for it makes the task of manipulating cleavages easier and the 
probability of a ‘floating vote’ less likely. In the same vein, the strength of civil 
society and associational life in South Africa provides a countervailing force to the 
dominant party’s control over the electorate. Second, the globalised international 
political economy wherein the South African state is embedded minimises the 
availability of a strong interventionist state thus reducing its reach and hindering 
the effective use of patronage politics. And, third, the status of industrialisation and 
size of organised labour suggests a stronger emphasis on corporatism as strategic 
device for the ANC to entrench its dominance. These differences, together with the 
fact that - compared to the INC - the ANC is much less prepared organisationally 
to bring about sufficient elite-mass integration, may account for a different 
development of the two countries’ systems of OPD. 
Nevertheless, three scenarios based on the Indian experience of post-OPD 
development are likely to emerge in the South African context as well: Tensions 
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within the ruling tripartite alliance may foreshadow a split of the dominant party as 
was the case with the INC in 1969. But whereas the INC under Indira was able to 
consolidate electoral dominance once again, a leftwing contender of the ANC 
harping on a similar ideological programme and relying to some extent on the same 
clientele, would make a return to a system of OPD more difficult. Another scenario 
would be the regionalisation of the South African party system along the Indian 
pattern. Signs of a conflict between national leadership and provincial ANC cadres 
that stems from a neglect of the provinces by the upper echelons of the party are 
already visible and remind one of the clashes of the INC’s governing elite and the 
‘Syndicate’. Additionally, the demographic distribution within South Africa allows 
for the materialisation of differing patterns of party competition in the provinces 
and the emergence of sub-national tendencies. The final and most dangerous 
scenario would be the turning of the ANC’s leadership to a kind of populism as 
exercised by Indira Gandhi and based on the need to accommodate and mobilise 
the rural poor and unemployed in order to uphold control over the electorate. 
As we have seen from the foregoing, the ‘road’ that the South African party 
system will take is much more dependent on decision-making by and agency of the 
party elite than on any kind of structural or institutional determinism. 
 
O P D :  M I D W I F E  O R  G R A V E D I G G E R  O F  D E M O C R A C Y ?  
 
Now to the final and most important question of the paper, a question that I am not 
ready yet to answer satisfactorily, at least with regard to the South African context: 
Has OPD a positive or negative effect on processes of democratic consolidation, 
national integration and socio-economic development as the most pressing 
challenges changing societies are facing? 
What seems clear is that OPD contributed to India’s political stability and 
integrative capacity in the first two decades following independence. And, even 
sceptics of the putative benefits of OPD for nascent democracies like Giliomee and 
Simkins (1999: 3) concede that the ANC’s dominance was a much better 
stabilising mechanism than “(…) a fragmented party system with a huge price at 
stake [where] competition might well have been so fierce as to derail the 
democratisation process.” When we turn to the contribution of the ‘Congress 
system’ to India’s democratic resilience and socio-economic development, we are 
on more speculative ground. On the one hand, some of the mechanisms of control 
described above sail close to the winds of a full-fledged liberal democracy and 
India’s record of economic growth and distribution is far from being impressive. 
On the other hand, given the context of changing societies that demands capacities 
from the political system going far beyond the ‘classic’ functions ascribed to 
parties and the party system in western democracies, India’s democratic career and 
incremental growth is remarkable. And, seemingly ‘undemocratic’ features of the 
representational system, like clientelism or patronage politics, gain a new meaning 
considering this specific context. As Kitschelt (2000: 873) argues: 
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(…) in the absence of a redistributive welfare state, democratic 
politicians may contain distributive struggles from spinning out of 
control and threatening the foundations of democracy by building 
clientelist-elite linkages wherever the circumstances are conducive 
[…]. For democracies from India to much of Latin America, clientelist 
politics has constituted the functional equivalent of the welfare state, 
appeasing the have-nots to abide by political orders that tremendously 
advantage the haves. 
 
But the argument – and final point made here - for a positive impact of OPD on 
democratisation in changing societies is based on another, more actor-oriented 
reason: Taking the stabilising effect of the Indian system of OPD as a premise for a 
judgement on the South African context, I would like to put an emphasis on party 
system characteristics as political opportunities or constraints bearing greatly on 
actors’ decisions as to whether or not they can tolerate a democratic game. 
Referring to a recent consideration of Angrist (2001) this line of thinking conceives 
of a viable democracy as a bargain struck by elite actors, a bargain which no actor 
is keen to terminate. As long as no actor is calculating the risk of open-ended 
governance outcomes (as the essence of democratic governance) as to high, 
democracy as “the only game in town” (Przeworski 1990) has a chance to survive. 
Angrist now puts the pivotal role of parties and party system characteristics as 
determining factors of who will wield policy-making power to the fore. Depending 
on the outline of the party system the ‘assessment of what rival parties bring to the 
competitive market ideologically, organisationally and mobilisationally’ is a 
decisive factor in any given party elite’s calculation whether democratic 
governance is tolerable. A system of OPD at least offers the chance that this 
calculation is made in favour of democratic governance. 
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